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PANAMA TOLLS QUESTION
It is probable that the impartial historian will come to the con-
clusion that there is a great deal to be said for the American con-
tention regarding the Panama Tolls. The acquisition of the
Canal Zone, let it be observed at once, does not seem to affect the
position. The liabilities of the United States in the isthmus could
scarcely be affected by their own act.
But what are those liabilities? The Treaties of 1850 and 1901
are so badly drawn, and are expressed in such a slovenly way, as
to make it far from an easy matter to pronounce off-hand upon
questions of their interpretation. It seems not unfair to con-
clude that the negotiators designedly used ambiguous language,
in order to put off until another time the necessity of arriving at
a really clear and complete understanding. The Treaty of 1850
contained a loose and vague aspiration (Clause VIII), quite out
of place in a business instrument. The Treaty of 1901 is even
worse drafted. Acclaimed at the time as a monument to Paunce-
fote's statesmanship and discretion, it now reveals itself as hav-
ing raised more difficulties than it laid, and as havin.g made con-
fusion worse confounded.
The Treaty of 1850, in its practical clauses (I to VII) deals
with Central America and with Central America only. American
capitalists were contemplating a Nicaraguan canal. Palmerston
stupidly blocked it by invoking the "rights" of an engaging tribe
of savages whom he suddenly discovered (without a scintilla of
evidence) to be allies of Great Britain, and who have long since
been willingly abandoned to Nicaragua. For the modest quid
pro quo implied in the removal of this block, Mr. Clayton con-
ceded the self-denying clauses of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of
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1850. So far as these clauses were practical, they were limited
to Central America.
Now "Central America" was not a loose expression. It had
a quite definite and well-known meaning. There had recently
existed a state styled "Central America" composing the territory
of Gautumala, Honduras, San Salvador, Costa Rica and Nica-
ragua. And this is what the negotiators meant. They were not
thinking of Panama. Demonstrably this is so. Mr. Clayton's
dispatch of July, 1850, to Sir H. Bulwer expressly states that
the expression "was intended to and does include all the Central
American States of Guatemala, Honduias, San Salvador, Nica-
ragua and Costa Rica".
But in the unfortunate Article VIII, which is little more than
a literary flourish, they looked beyond "Central America".
"VIII. The Governments of Great Britain and the United
States having not only desired, in entering into this convention,
to accomplish a general object, but also to establish a general
principle,-they hereby agree to extend their protection by treaty
stipulations to any other practicable communications, whether by
canal or railway, across the isthmus which connects North and
South America,-and more especially to the inter-oceanic com-
munications, should the same prove to be practicable, whether by
canal or railway, which are now proposed to be established by
the way of Tehuantepec or Panama. In granting, however, their
joint protection to any such canals or railways as are by this
article specified, it is always understood by Great Britain and the
United States that the parties constructing or owning the same
shall impose no other charges or conditions of traffic thereupon
than the aforesaid governments shall approve of as just and
equitable; and that the same canals or railways, being open to
the subjects and citizens of Great Britain and the United States
on equal terms, shall also be open on like terms to the subjects
and citizens of every other state which is willing to grant thereto
uch protection as Great Britain and the United States engage to
afford."
Let us analyze this remarkable section a little closely. It pretty
obviously contemplates, in the first place, a canal constructed by
private capital. The whole treaty does that. The whole treaty is
free from any trace of the conception of a National Canal. It
is pre-occupied with the possibility of a private company con-
structing the canal and charging monopolistic rates which might
be discriminative, but which might be equally objectionable as
extortionate. Even in the main body of the treaty (Arts. I-VII)
all that the contracting parties undertake-besides the repudia-
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tion of exclusive control or advantages-is to protect the pro-
jected Central American Canal, but not to protect it unless it is
reasonably and fairly worked. Protection, in those disturbed
regions, was obviously a necessity for private persons. If ad-
ditional proof were needed, it will be found in th( fact that
Art. III speaks of "the parties" undertaking the work; Art. V
of "the persons or company" undertaking or managing the same;
Art. VII of to "persons or company" offering to commence the
same; and Art. VIII of "the parties" constructing or owning the
canal.
In perfect accordance with this general scheme, the contracting
parties agree in Art. VIII to protect any other inter-oceanic com-
munication, constructed, it is implied, by private persons,--so
long as those private persons .act in a reasonable and fair spirit
towards commerce, but not otherwise.
Observe, there is no word in Art. VIII about disclaiming con-
trol. That provision extended only to "Central America". Quite
reasonably: for it was in that region that Britain had affected
to exercise control, and it was in respect of that region that it
was necessary to disclaim it. In exchange for Britain's dis-
claimer of her shadowy protectorate in Mosquito, the states gave
up the right to acquire control in all Central America. But it is
not likely that they thought of giving up, in return for this slen-
der- concession, the right to acquire by lawful means control
throughout the rest of the two Americas! If the Art. VIII meant
to extend to the whole of the Americas the scheme established
by Arts. I-VIII for Central America, then Britain should at once
have retired from Canada, Guiana, and the Falkland Islands! If
the treaty did not mean that, then Art. VIII does not extend the
r9gime of equal canal rates established by Arts. I and VII beyond
Central America-and therefore not to Panama. It is only the
joint protection, established in Art. VII, and totally unconnected
with the repudiation of special advantages contained in Art. I,
that by Art. VIII they extend to Panama and other inter-oceanic
canals.
Proof positive is afforded by the existence of the Panama Rail-
way. This comes under Art. VIII. But no one thinks of the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in connection with it- because all that
it provides is a platonic joint protection which has never been
required or invoked.
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The whole scheme of Art. VIII is executory. Its objects are
to be carried out, as the occasion arises, "by treaty stipulations"
in futuro, suited to the requirements of each particular case. And
always the idea of private ownership is present. Both countries
agree, in a vague manner, to come to a future understanding as
to "protecting" the hypothetical private "constructors and owners"
of future canals and railroads. Only they make it clear that they
will only protect them if they are unreasonable.
It follows that if either government constructed a canal itself,
no "protection" would be required, and no question as to the
terms on which it should be conceded would arise. Art. VIII,
then, (1) is executory and commits the signatories to nothing:
(2) it only lays down the terms of "protection": (3) it is inap-
plicable to the case of construction by governments.
Both Mr. Blaine and Mr. Frelinghuysen strongly asserted the
first of these three propositions in 1881-2.1
Now if matters stood there, things would be simple. It might
be a shock to Great Britain to learn that the Panama Canal was
outside the scope of all the effective clauses of the Treaty of
1850: but it would be very difficult to escape the conclusion, when
once the instrument is calmly scrutinized. The analogy of the
Panama Railroad would have been almost conclusive.
But then we have to consider the Treaty of 1901.
By Art. I, this swept away the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850.
As to the absolute and positive effect of this there can be no ques-
tion. Even if the rest of the treaty were to fail of effect, this first
provision would, I think, still hold good. Then the treaty begins
to flounder.
We must go back to the preamble. It recites that the treaty is
concluded in order to get rid of any objections which might arise
to the United States constructing or subsidizing the construction
of an inter-oceanic canal, on account of the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty. Now we have just seen that that treaty had nothing to
say to the construction of such a canal outside "Central America":
except that the contracting powers pledged themselves to "pro-
tect" such a canal, so long as it was fairly'worked by those who
constructed and owned it. Therefore it could only be a Central
American canal which the United States were precluded from,
or hampered in, constructing, by that treaty. Art. I of the Clay-
ton-Bulwer Treaty certainly did so hamper them. For it dis-
I Despatches to Mr. Lowell, 19 Nov., 1881; 29 Nov., 1881; 8 May, 1882.
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tinctly provided that they should exercise no influence or control
in Central America. When, therefore, the preamble speaks of
"a canal", it means a Central American canal. The treaty was
not needed in respect of any other. Nor can it be supposed for a
moment that the United States meant to limit their free right of
constructing a canal, say, from Chicago to San Francisco, should
the progress of science make it economically possible. The
Treaty of 1901 was merely concluded to remove the disabilities
imposed in 1850. And these only concerned Central America. In
point of fact, it was the Lakes route via Nicaragua which was,
at the moment of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, most
talked about.
Therefore when Art. I says that "the" canal may be con-
structed by the United States, it means this canal-a canal which
they cannot construct without the new treaty-a canal in "Cen-
tral America."
The wording of the treaty is deplorably bad. It speaks of "the
canal", as though only one could ever be made. But it cannot
refer to every inter-oceanic canal that may ever be made in the
future. It is very extraordinary that Britain undertakes no cor-
responding obligations. She can apparently build a canal -or a
ship-railway across Mexico or Colombia, or even across Nicara-
gua or Honduras, and discriminate as much as she, likes in the
tolls charged.
So far as the canal contemplated by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty
is concerned, nothing is said about equality of charges until we
come to Art. III. And then the provision takes the remarkable
form of a sort of condition upon which the canal will be regarded
by Great Britain as free from attack in time of war. That is,
the proviso for equal charges is not a sfraightforward agreement,
but it is introduced in an oblique and-if the expression may be
forgiven--"slinking" manner, as "the basis of the neutralization
of such ship-canal".
Now neutralization refers to a state of war. All that Art. III
necessarily imports, therefore, is that Britain would be justified
in disregarding the artificial "neutrality" of the canal, if its terms
were infringed. It gives Britain no absolute right to insist on
equal charges. All that it says is that she may disregard its
quasi-neutrality, and attack it in war, if its charges have not com-
plied with the condition or "basis" of neutralization.
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But suppose we concede that "neutralization" has a peculiar
meaning in this article. We shall have to concede, at the same
time, that the minds of the negotiators were in a state of com-
plete muddle ;--but that is far from an impossible supposition.
Suppose we concede that "neutralization" does not refer to' war
alone, but that it connotes a certain "internationalization" in time
of peace, can we not then construe the article as containing a
positive engagement to charge equal tolls?
I think we can: but it is a violent supposition.
Every one of the other five clauses of this wretched Article III
distinctly and solely refer to a state of war! The inference is
irresistible that "neutralization" means "treatment as neutral in
war-time". In that case, the provision for equal tolls, as the
"basis" of such neutralization.
There is only one thing against that inference, and that is the
astonishing fact that the preamble speaks of "neutralization" as
descriptive of the rgirne introduced by Art. VIII of the Treaty
of 1850. As we have seen, all that Art. VIII established was a
scheme of joint protection on certain conditions. The nego-
tiators in 1901 appear to have mistaken that for a scheme of abso-
lute guaranteed equality, and to have thought that for such a
r~gime "neutralization" was an appropriate term!
If we can impute to them such crass disregard of the terms of
the treaty they professed to be modifying or replacing, then we
may take "neutralization" in Art. III of 1901 to mean the same
thing as "neutralization" in the preamble, i. e., a system of inter-
national equality in the use of the canal.
Needless to say, this is a highly improper use of the term "neu-
tralization". Needless to say, no such r~gime was contained in
Art. VIII of 1850. But if the negotiators of 1901 thought it was,
it is just possible to hold that-with regard to a Central Ameri-
can canal-Art. III of 1901 imposes a positive obligation to
charge equal tolls. Its reference to a "basis of neutralization"
would be, in that case, a clumsy way of stating the terms on
which the canal was to be preserved for international use on
equal terms, free inter die. from warlike interruption. But it
must be repeated, this is an entirely forced construction which
seems to strain language to the breaking point.
Supposing, lastly, that the considerations now adduced are in-
correct: that in spite of the clearest indications to the contrary,
the treaty does include Panama, and does import a positive en-
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gagement to charge equal tolls, is that engagement infringed by
the legislation of the United States?
As above ifidicated, I do not think that the fact of having
acquired the soil of the canal can release the States from their
obligations-whatever they are (and I think they are, exceedingly
slender)-in respect of it. Nor does there seem to be any weight
in the argument which would exclude the United States, from the
outset, from coming within the equality clause. It runs:
"The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce
and of war of all nations observing these rules, on terms of entire
equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any such
nation, or its citizens or subjects, in respect of the conditions or
charges of traffic or otherwise. Such conditions and charges of
traffic shall be just and equitable."
The requirements are put in quite an impersonal form. "All
nations" are to be equal in the canal. It is not that the United
States will treat all nations equally-but that "all nations" shall
be equal there. The use of the word "citizens" is instructive in
this connection. It is not impossible that it might be intended to
refer to France or other republics. But it strongly suggests that
the people of the United States were in the mind of the negotia-
tors.
Nor can x'ie admit the argument that, even if United States'
vessels are generally included in the clause; there is a tacit excep-
tion of the coasting trade. Such a tacit exception is not usual:
it has never, in fact occurred. Coasting traffic is always expressly
excepted (if it is intended to except it) from the operation of
treaties of commerce. And, internationally, it is improbable that
a voyage from New York to San Francisco would be looked upon
as a "coasting" trade, whether it passed through the Straits of
Magellan or traversed the canal. Certainly, a voyage from
Liverpool to New Zealand would not be any the more a coasting
voyage because the ship refrained from touching at Rio, or be-
cause she did touch at Cape Town.
2
But would a rebate to United States' shipping passing through
the canal be fair?
Certainly it seems difficult to see how there-can be any objec-
tion to this in principle. So long as the tolls are fair-that is, so
long as they are not greater than is required to cover the cost of
construction, working and maintenance of the canal, who can
2 Cf. to cases collected in Law Magazine and Review, London.
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complain if the United States choose to make presents to their
own shipping-? The Oxford Professor of International Law
(for whose opinion everyone must have high respect, urges in a
recent address delivered before that University, that the pro-
visions of every commercial treaty would be liable to be evaded,
and its promised equality denied, if a nation were at liberty to
impose high duties impartially, and to grant rebates to favored
nations. But no such situation arises in a case like the present,
where the proper amount of its tolls is ascertainable by calcula-
tion at a definite sum. All nations, in proportion as they use the
canal, must bear an equal share in meeting its cost. But there is
no reason to imply a further undertaking that they will not en-
courage their own shipping to use the canal-or, for the matter
of that, to refrain from using it. Is it suggested that Great Brit-
ain may not deter its ships by penalties from using the canal?
It may be concluded, therefore, that the canal lies, like the
Panama Railway, outside the scope of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.
and of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty which took its place,--that
the supposed stipulation for equal tolls is nothing but a condition
of neutral treatment in war-time,-and that there is nothing re-
pugnant to the terms of this condition in a rebate to American
shipping using the canal.
T. Baty, D.C.L., LL.D.
Temple, London, Eng.
